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1. Introduction
Public transport operators increasingly use yield management techniques in establishing mixtures of
ticket types and fare levels. In predicting the response of the market to specific fare classes and levels
(eg weekly ticket), a knowledge of  how various market segments respond to both the choice of ticket
type within a public transport mode and the choice between modes is crucial to the outcome. In some
circumstances the interest is in evaluating the patronage and revenue implications of variations in
offered prices for the existing regime of fare classes; in other circumstances the interest is in changes
in the fare class offerings either through deletions and/or additions of classes.
A missing ingredient in many operational studies is a matrix of appropriate direct and cross fare
elasticities which relate to specific fare classes within a choice set of fare class opportunities.
Surprisingly the research literature is relatively barren of empirical evidence that is rich enough to
distinguish sensitivities to particular fare class offerings within a predefined choice set of offerings.
Although there is a plethora of empirical evidence offered on direct elasticities (Oum et al 1992,
Goodwin 1992), primarily treated as unweighted or weighted average fares within each public
transport mode, a review of the extant literature (Table 1) illustrates the limited evidence on cross-
elasticities.
The cross-elasticities for rail and bus with respect to bus and rail fares are very similar, with an
unweighted average value of 0.24 ±  0.06. The car-to-public transport and public transport-to-car
cross elasticities however are quite different. The average cross elasticity of car demand with respect
to bus fares is 0.09 ±  0.07; and with respect to train fares it is 0.08 ±  0.03. These values are
significantly higher for travel to CBD destinations where the propensity to use public transport is
greater (ie higher initial modal share). Authors such as Glaister and Lewis (1978) have stated that
the evidence on elasticities for the impact of public transport fares on car traffic for the off-peak are
largely guesswork. Twenty years on, little appears to have changed.
The majority of the evidence is based on studies using data collected in the 1970’s. The studies from
which the reported cross elasticities are drawn do not consider the variations in cross- elasticities with
respect to ticket type. The estimates in Table 1 which distinguish time of day refer to modal
substitution within that period, not substitution of travel by a given mode between times of the day.
Using unpublished data from a number of USA consultant cross-section studies, Mayworm et al
(1980) have made estimates of peak/off-peak fare cross- elasticities ranging between 0.03 and 0.38
for peak demand elasticity with respect to off-peak fares, and 0.02-0.03 for off-peak demand
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elasticity with respect to peak fares. The wide range for peak demand elasticities with respect to off-
peak fares compared to the off-peak elasticity suggests that there is greater flexibility in switching
from the peak to the off-peak than vice versa. This appears counter-intuitive and begs further
empirical investigation.
The empirical evidence on fare cross- elasticities is typically limited to aggregate measures across all
fare types and levels, occasionally stratified by time of day and trip length. A most recent study by
Acutt and Dodgson (1996) derives aggregate cross elasticities based on the average fare per journey
in Great Britain in six markets ( Intercity rail, Network South East, Regional railways, London
underground, London buses, and other local buses). The cross elasticities range from .013 for local
buses to .094 for Intercity rail, within the range reported in Table 1 for studies from the 1970’s.
Given the high degree of variability in site-specific results, public transport operators are wary of
using default estimates from published sources; in addition the inability to disaggregate the estimates
by fare class taking into account the full range of ticket types on offer raises fundamental concerns
about the operational usefulness of the basket of published estimates. Elasticities related to specific
ticket types are generally absent from the literature, and non-existent in Australia.
To obtain useful empirical elasticities applicable to particular ticket types, fare levels and mixes of
ticket types offered requires site-specific empirical studies. This paper departs from the reliance on
average fares, distinguishing between fare classes across two public transport modes (train, bus) and
the automobile for commuting travel in the Sydney Metropolitan area. Full matrices of direct and
cross share elasticities are derived for three train fare classes, three bus fare classes and car travel
for commuters on non-concessionary tickets. To evaluate sizeable variations in the levels of fares in
each ticket class so that operators have extended policy intelligence beyond market experience, stated
choice reponses are combined with a knowledge of current modal attributes from revealed preference
data to assess the ticket and mode choices made. Equivalent elasticities for non-commuters in the
non-concessionary market have been obtained but are not reported herein.
The motivation for such disaggregation is twofold. First public transport operators have little interest
in empirical approaches which treat all fare classes as an equivalent one-way average fare - this is
not a useful operational framework within which to make decisions on fare setting. Secondly,
empirical measurement of indicators of behavioural response to specific ticket types given the set of
ticket types available will enable PT operators to identify the impact of these various ticket type (and
level) scenarios on overall patronage and revenue. The incorporation of these elasticities  into a
Decision Support System (DSS) allows an operator to evaluate the implications of various fares
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policies on the net social benefit per dollar of ‘subsidy’ or community service obligation (CSO)
payment provided as well as the externality benefits such as traffic congestion reduction ( Hensher
and Raimond 1995).
Table 1: A Synthesis of Indicative Empirical Evidence on the Cross-Elasticity of 
Urban Public Transport Fares
Elasticity Context Result Data Type Reference
Car use with respect to bus fares
for peak work trips:
London (1970-75)
Boston (1965)
Cook County, Illinois (1961)
San Francisco (1973)
Melbourne (1964)
0.06
0.14
0.21
0.12
0.19
Time Series
Cross section
Cross section
Cross section
Cross section
Lewis (1977)
Kraft and Domencich (1972)
Warner (1962)
McFadden (1974)
Shepherd (1972)
Car use with respect to train
fares for peak work trips:
Sydney (1976) 0.09 Before & After Hensher and Bullock (1979)
Car use with respect to bus and
train fares for peak work trips:
Sydney (1981) 0.06 Cross section Madan and Groenhout
(1987)
Rail use with respect to bus fares
for peak work trips:
San Francisco (1973)
London (1970-75)
0.28
0.14
Cross section
Time series
McFadden (1974)
Glaister and Lewis (1978)
Rail use with respect to bus fares
for off-peak travel:
San Francisco 0.28 Cross-section McFadden (1974)
Rail use with respect to bus fares
for all hours:
London (1970-73)
0.25 Weekly time
series
Fairhurst and Morris (1975)
Bus use with respect to rail fare
for peak work trips:
San Francisco (1973)
London (1970-75)
0.25
0.14
Cross section
Time series
McFadden (1974)
Glaister and Lewis (1978)
Bus use with respect to rail fares
for off peak trips:
London (1970-75) 0.28 Time series Glaister and Lewis (1978)
Car use with respect to rail fares
for peak work trips:
San Francisco (1973)
London (1970-75)
0.13
0.06
Cross section
Time series
McFadden (1974)
Glaister and Lewis (1978)
Bus use with respect to rail fares
for all hours:
London (1970-73) 0.25 Time series Fairhurst and Morris (1975)
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the ticket/mode choice modelling task within a
microeconomic framework which guides the formulation of the indirect utility function associated
with each alternative. Section 3 introduces a discrete choice model associated with the family of
random utility models - heteroskedastic extreme value logit (HEVL) - which relaxes the strong
assumption of constant variance in the unobserved effects to allow the cross- elasticities  to break
away from the equality constraint imposed in the multinomial logit model and within partitions of the
popular nested logit model. Section 4 outlines the empirical context in which we source revealed and
stated preference data to provide an enriched utility space for assessing behavioural responses to fare
scenarios extending beyond the range observed in real markets. Section 5 presents the empirical
evidence as a full matrix of direct and cross share elasticities for commuting travel. A set of
conclusions highlight the major contribution of this study.
2. Microeconomic Specification of the Indirect Utility Function for Choice
Alternatives
The functional form of the conditional indirect utility expression defining the set of attributes
determining the probability of selecting a mode is typically assumed in revealed preference models to
be linear additive with the occasional use of logarithmic or Box-Cox transformations designed to
improve the statistical ‘fit’ (eg Gaudry et al 1988) and occasionally specified with quadratic terms in
a stated choice model with mean centered or orthogonal codes for each attribute (eg Hensher 1996).
The derivation of the functional form from microeconomic theory is noticeably barren (with rare
exception - see below) in most transportation modal choice applications, although many more
examples exist in other transport applications, especially in automobile choice studies ( eg Hensher et
al 1992, Mannering and Winston 1985, and Train 1986).
An exception in the modal choice literature is Jara-Diaz and Videla (1989) who have derived an
appropriate functional form for the indirect utility expression for a discrete mode choice model from
microeconomic principles, showing that the inclusion of the income effect is accommodated by the
inclusion of a quadratic term in cost and segmentation of the sample by income where the quadratic
cost variable is statistically significant. It has been known for some time (but often ignored) that the
inclusion of income as a separate explanatory variable serves only as a proxy for unobserved
attributes of alternatives like comfort and convenience and other dimensions of taste, not captured by
the taste weights (e.g. Hensher 1984). Efforts to interact cost and income by dividing modal cost by
the wage rate (eg Train and McFadden 1978) implicitly treats income as an endogenous variable that
depends on the number of hours worked at a given wage rate in contrast to its role as an exogenous
variable in an individual’s budget constraint.
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Without realising  it, the analysts estimating stated choice models with higher order cost attributes
such as a quadratic are correctly incorporating a test of the presence/absence of the income effect in
the discrete choice model; unfortunately they then introduce income as an additive explanatory
variable in J-1 alternatives and interpret its taste weight as a measure of the marginal utility of
income; in fact the marginal utility of income is a derivative of the cost variables as shown by Jara-
Diaz and Videla (1989). Inclusion of income as an income effect requires its inclusion in the indirect
utility expressions for all alternatives.
Formally ,  after Jara-Diaz and Videla (1989) and Hensher (1996), for a sampled individual with a
set of taste weights and income I, define a vector of non-modal trip goods X and a vector of
associated prices P. The attributes of available modes, including trip cost, given by a vector Aj, are
the observed and unobserved (by analyst) sources of utility, introduced into an indirect utility
function evaluated by an individual in arriving at a choice. Imposing the separability condition on the
numeraire non-trip goods and modal alternatives defined by a set of taste-weighted modal attributes,
the individual is assumed to behave as if they are maximising utility by comparing the set of modal
alternatives given the separability assumption for X and each of Aj, j = 1,2,..., M modes:
Max{max[U1(X) + U2(Aj)]|PX ' + cj£I}; jÎ{1,...,M}; XÎx                               (1)
A conditional indirect utility function can be derived from (1) by the application of Roy’s identity, to
yield equation (2)
V(P, I - cj, Aj) = V 1(P , I - cj) + U2(Qj) (2)
where the maximum conditional indirect utility is attributed to the chosen alternative from a mutually
exclusive set of alternatives.
Jara-Diaz and Videla (1989) demonstrate that if one takes a higher order Taylor series expansion
this implies solving equation (3), re-expressed as equation (4).
Max
j
[V1(P , I ) + 1i!Si =1
n-1
V1
i (P , I )(-cj)i + 1n!
V1
n(P , I )(-cj)n+U2(Aj)] (3)
Max
j
[ 1
i!Si =1
n-1
V1
i (P, I )(-cj)i + 1n!
V1
n(P, I )(-cj)n+U 2(Aj)] (4)
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From equation (4) we have identified an empirical opportunity to evaluate the dependency of mode
choice on income. Adding at least a quadratic term for cost (equation (5)) will establish the potential
for income dependency. In the words of Jara-Diaz and Videla (1989, 396)
 “...if a single model with utility in ci, ci2, and Ai were run for the whole population, a
null coefficient of ci2 would be consistent with a single coefficient for ci. ,..., but a
significant coefficient of ci2 would be contradictory with the model, since V1
i  should
be a function of I. Note that I is not explicitly included in V, but significant  ci2 terms
for each segment would suggest the existence of a more general ... V(ci, ti, I)
function”.
Vi = a0i  + bc1ic1i  + bc2ic2i2  + U2(Ai )                                                                      (5)
Thus if  bc2i  is positive and statistically significant, an income effect exists and it is necessary to
either segment by income so that income is affecting all alternatives in the choice set or income is
accommodated in all indirect utility expressions. Having established that there is an income effect,
and in the interest of maintaining a single discrete choice model, we need to introduce income into all
indirect utility expressions in a way that is consistent with microeconomic theory. One appealing
way is to adopt the approach promoted by Train and McFadden (1978), Hensher et al (1992), Jara-
Diaz and Ortuzar (1988), Jara-Diaz and Videla (1989) and Jara-Diaz (1996) where a first order
expansion of indirect utility yields a model in which  money cost is divided by the expenditure rate,
the latter defined as the ratio of household income to leisure (or non-work) time.  This formulation
represents income as purchasing power.
If one were to undertake income segmentation, then to avoid an arbitrary segmentation one could
calculate the marginal utility of income and identify the variation in the marginal utility of income
over the personal income space of the sampled population, yielding a number of income groupings.
Various classification methods are available to identify the number of ‘homogeneous’ segments ( see
Brieman et al 1993). The marginal utility of income is given by:
¶Vi
¶I
 =  bc1i  + 2bc2i c2i                                                                                                   (6)
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3. Specifying a Choice Model
The ticket type and mode choice model is based on the utility maximisation  hypothesis which
assumes that an individual’s choice of ticket type conditional on mode and choice of mode is a
reflection of the underlying preferences for each of the available alternatives and that the individual
selects the alternative with the highest utility. The utility that an individual associates with an
alternative is specified as the sum of a deterministic component (that depends on observed attributes
of the alternative and the individual) and a random component (that represents the effects of
unobserved attributes of the individual and unobserved characteristics of the alternative).
In the majority of mode choice models, the random components of the utilities of the different
alternatives are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IID) with a type I extreme
value distribution. This results in the multinomial logit model of mode choice (McFadden, 1974).
The multinomial logit model has a simple and elegant closed-form mathematical structure, making it
easy to estimate and interpret. However, it is saddled with the “independence of irrelevant
alternatives” (IIA) property at the individual level ( Hensher and Johnson 1981, Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1985); that is, the multinomial logit model imposes the restriction of equal cross- elasticities
due to a change in an attribute affecting only the utility of an alternative i for all alternatives j ¹ i.
This property of equal proportionate change of unchanged modes is unlikely to represent actual
choice behaviour in many situations. Such misrepresentation of choice behaviour can lead to
misleading projections of mode share on a new or upgraded service and of diversion from existing
modes.
The model developed herein falls under the category of non-IID models. Specifically, we develop a
random utility model with independent, but non-identical random terms distributed with a type I
extreme value distribution. This heteroskedastic extreme value model allows the utility of
alternatives to differ in the amount of stochasticity (Bhat 1995). Unequal variances of the random
components is likely to occur when the variance of an unobserved variable that affects choice is
different for different alternatives. For example, in a mode choice model, if comfort is an unobserved
variable whose values vary considerably for the train mode (based on, say, the degree of crowding on
different train lines) but little for the automobile mode, then the random components for the
automobile and train modes will have different variances ( Horowitz, 1981). We apply this model in
the current study. Once we relax the constant variance assumption we have to distinguish scale and
taste, to which we now turn.
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3.1 The Inseparability of Taste and Scale
It has been well-known for some time that a fundamental link exists between the scale of the
estimated parameters and the magnitude of the random component in all choice models based on
Random Utility Theory (RUT) (see, e.g., Hensher and Johnson 1980; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985).
Let
Uiq = Viq + eiq, (7)
where Uiq is the unobserved, latent utility individual  q associates with alternative i;  Viq is the
systematic, quantifiable proportion of utility which can be expressed in terms of observables of
alternatives and consumers; and the eiq’s are the random or unobservable effects associated with the
utility of alternative i and individual  q.  All RUT-based choice models are derived by making some
assumptions about the distribution of the random effects; regardless of the particular assumption
adopted, there is an embedded scale parameter, which is inversely related to the magnitude of the
random component, that cannot be separately identified from the taste parameters.
For example, to derive the Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model from (7), we assume that the eiq’s
are IID Type I Extreme Value (or Gumbel) distributed. The scale parameter l³0 of the Gumbel
distribution is inversely proportional to the variance of the error component, thus, s p liq
2 2 26= / .
The fundamental identification problem of RUT-based choice models shows itself in the MNL model
through the fact that the vector of parameters actually estimated from any given source of RUT-
conformable preference data is actually ( lb), where b is the vector of taste parameters. This is
clearly seen in the full expression of the MNL choice probability:
P
V
V
X
X
iq
iq
jq
j C
iq
jq
j Cn q
= =
Î Î
å å
exp( )
exp( )
exp( )
exp( )
l
l
lb
lb
, (8)
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where Piq is the choice probability of alternative i for individual  q, and the systematic utility
Viq=bXiq. Since a given set of data is characterised by some value of l, this constant is normalised to
some value (say, one), and analysis proceeds as if  ( lb) were the taste parameters.1
The basic reason for the pervasiveness of this identification problem is that choice models are
specifying a structural relationship between a categorical response and a latent variable (i.e. utility).
As in structural equation models involving latent variables, it is necessary to specify both origin and
variance (read “scale”) for the latent variable(s) to permit identification of utility function parameters
(Hensher et al 1997).
Recognition of the role of the scale parameter in the estimation and interpretation of choice models
came somewhat late in the game, but was triggered by the desire to combine sources of preference
data, especially revealed preference ( RP) and stated preference (SP) data. The paradigm shift
involving efforts to combine sources of preference data was inspired by Morikawa’s (1989) insight
that if data generation processes underlying SP and RP data are the same, model parameters should
differ only by a constant of proportionality. Morikawa (1989) noted that the fundamental
identification problem was confined to a single preference data source, and that the ratio of l’s in
two or more sources of data could be identified. Morikawa’s dissertation (1989), and subsequent
work (e.g., Ben-Akiva and Morikawa 1991) demonstrated that the ratio(s) of l’s could be estimated
both sequentially ( Swait et al 1994) and simultaneously ( Morikawa 1989; Hensher and Bradley
1995; Bhat 1995).
The estimation problem amounts to placing an equality restriction on the taste parameters of K
preference data sources to be combined (i.e. b1=...=bK= b) and estimating K additional scale
parameters (l1,..., lK). One of these scale parameters must be fixed, say l1=1. The remaining scale
parameters are then interpreted as inverse variance ratios with respect to the referent data source.
The corresponding unrestricted model frees the taste parameters and the scale factors for the K data
sources by estimating (lkbk), k=1,...,K. The null hypothesis of interest is that of taste invariance
across data sources, after permitting variance/reliability differences  such an hypothesis can be tested
using a likelihood ratio statistic.
This understanding of the role of the scale parameter has spawned several related research streams,
most notably a “data fusion” stream, primarily associated with travel choice modelling (e.g.,
                                                 
1Note that the MNL model predicts random choice when l®0, and approximates a step function for the
alternative with maximal utility as l®¥ (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). This general behavior applies
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Morikawa 1989; Ben-Akiva and Morikawa 1991; Hensher and Bradley 1993; Swait, Louviere and
Williams 1995), and a more general stream concerned with comparing and testing models estimated
from any sources of preference data consistent with RUT (e.g., Swait and Louviere 1993; Louviere,
Fox and Moore 1993; Swait, et al. 1993; Louviere 1994; Swait, Louviere and Williams 1995;
Louviere 1996). The latter paradigm represents a more general view of combining data sources than
the former. First, it views the scale factor as an integral component of real behavioural processes , as
opposed to the view that the scale is a nuisance parameter that must be accounted for to permit
measurement of the true quantities of interest (e.g. taste parameters). Second, it encompasses a wider
scope of data combinations, involving RP with RP and SP with SP, as well as the RP with SP
combinations which are the sole interest of the “data fusion” stream.
The existing studies using data from multiple sources have all adopted a constant variance
assumption within the set of alternatives associated with each data set. They have set the scale
parameter to 1.0 for one data set and rescaled the other data set by a scale parameter which is
constant (but possibly not equal to 1.0) across the set of alternatives. The cross elasticities remain
subject to the IID assumption and hence are potentially ill conditioned. In  our study we relax the
constant variance assumption and allow all scale parameters to differ within and between two data
sets. We do this by a procedure known as a heteroskedastic extreme value (HEV) random utility
model. Joint estimation is essential to enable direct comparability in rescaling between the RP and
SP choice models, since only one alternative across both data sets has its variance on the unobserved
effects arbitrarily set to 1.0.
3.2 Random Effects Heteroskedastic Extreme Value Model
Allenby and Ginter (1995), Bhat (1995) and Hensher (1996) have recently implemented the HEV
model on a single data source. Hensher (1996a) has applied the Heteroscedastic HEV model to joint
estimation of SP and RP data.
With respect to the indirect utility function (5), we assume that the data are cross-sectional (hence no
temporal effects), there is no state dependence or serial dependence and tastes are homogenous.
Specifically,
U Xiq iq i iq iq iq= + +l a l b e   . (9)
                                                                                                                                                    
to all choice model specifications.
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Now assume that the liq  are equal to li   for all individuals q; in addition, assume they are
independently, but not identically, distributed across alternatives according to the Type I Extreme
Value density function f(t) = exp(-t)*exp(-exp(-t)) = -F(t)*log(F(t)), where F(.) is the corresponding
cumulative distribution function . If the decision rule is maximal utility, then the choice probabilities
are given by
P F V V f diq j iq jq iq i i iq iq
j i
= - +
¹-¥
¥
Õò ( )[ ] ( )l e l le e  .
(10)
The probabilities are evaluated numerically as there is no closed-form solution for th is single
dimensional  integral. The integral can be approximated , for example, using Gauss-Laguerre
quadrature (Press et al 1986). Computational experience has shown that a  68 point approximation is
sufficient to reproduce taste parameter estimates (see Greene 1996).
The heteroscedastic extreme value model nests the restrictive MNL and is flexible enough to allow
differential cross- elasticities among all pairs of alternatives. It avoids the a priori identification of
mutually exclusive market partitions of a nested MNL structure. It is parsimonious compared to the
MNP model, introducing only J-1 additional parameters in the covariance matrix as opposed to the
[J(J-1)/2]-1 additional parameters in the more general model (J is the total number of alternatives in
the universal choice set). It also poses much less of a computational burden than the MNP, requiring
only the evaluation of a one dimensional integral (independent of the number of alternatives) ; the
MNP, of course, requires the evaluation of a J-1 dimensional integral. Importantly, in contrast to the
multinomial probit model, the heteroscedastic extreme value model is easy to interpret and its
behaviour is intuitive ( Bhat 1995).
Hensher (1996a) has suggested that the HEV model is a useful device for identifying an appropriate
partitioning of the MNL model into a nested structure, replacing the search for structure in nested
MNL partitions. The reason for specifying a nested form of the MNL model is to accommodate
systematic dependencies among  the unobserved effects (leading to violation of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition ), which are not handled properly by the MNL model. Since the
HEV model is not closed-form, the appeal to the practitioner is that a nested specification consistent
with the HEV profile of li  will be easy to apply without the numerical integration  implicit in ( 10).
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The HEV model can be specified for multiple data sources, jointly estimated using a FIML
specification to produce a set of alternative-specific lambdas across both RP and SP choice sets,
normalising on an arbitrarily selected alternative.
4. The Empirical Context
A survey of a sample of commuters and non-commuters was undertaken in the Sydney Metropolitan
Area in 1995 as part of an inquiry into the mix and level of public transport fares. Within each
market segment patterns of modal and ticket use behaviour are captured to identify both current
behaviour and the potential to switch to alternative modal and ticket use behaviour under a range of
alternative fares policies for the government bus, ferry and train systems ( Hensher and Raimond
1995).
The choice of mode and ticket type is estimated using a mixture of revealed preference (RP) and
stated preference (SP) data. The RP data’s strengths lie in reflecting the current state of market
behaviour, whereas the SP data’s strengths are that it mirrors a more robust and less restricted
decision environment and presents a well-conditioned design matrix ( Swait et al 1994). RP data
provides information on the current market equilibrium for the behaviour of interest and is useful for
short term forecasting of departures from the current equilibrium. In contrast SP data is especially
rich in attribute trade-off information, but is to some extent affected by the degree of ‘contextual
realism’ that we can establish for the respondents (Hensher  1994). In deriving estimates of
elasticities, the  set of choice probabilities must reflect observed market behaviour (ie market shares),
and hence we use the RP model enriched by the parameter estimates produced from the SP data
appropriately re-scaled for each alternative when transferred  to the RP model.
4.1 Sourcing Revealed and Stated Preference Data
In the survey, respondents were asked to think about the last commuter trip they made, where they
went, how they travelled, how much it cost etc., then they were asked to describe another way they
could have made that trip if their current mode was not available. The current behaviour provides the
revealed preference data. The stated preference component of the survey varies public transport fares
of their current and alternative methods of travel under a series of different pricing scenarios. Ticket
prices were varied from current levels to 50% above and below current levels. Each respondent was
presented with four different scenarios (see Table 2), and different respondents are presented with
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different combinations of scenarios. Scenarios are generated and presented in a such that it is
possible to determine, under any fare scenario how many people will travel under each ticket and on
each mode, and thus derive how sensitive people are to fare changes. Their responses to these
different scenarios are recorded in terms of what mode of transport they would use and which fare
they would use.
Table 2.  Illustrative Set of Show Cards for the SP Experiment 1: Bus or Train for a 
Short Trip
You have told us that you could either use a Bus or a Train as the main form of transport to
travel to the destination that we have discussed.. If public transport fares changed and were
priced as below, would you have used Bus or Train as the main form of transport for your
trip? Which ticket type would you choose?
BUS FARES TRAIN FARES
Single $0.60 Single $0.80
TravelTen $4.00
(10 single trips)
Off Peak Return $0.90
(purchase after 9am)
TravelPass $8.60
(7 days bus/ferry)
Weekly $6.80
(7 days train only)
TravelPass $10.00
(7 days bus/ferry/train)
TravelPass $10.00
(7 days bus/ferry/train)
Given the primary emphasis is on developing a full matrix of direct and cross elasticities  for mode-
specific public transport fares under alternative choice sets of ticket types, we designed a sample that
captured a sufficient number of travellers currently choosing each of the available modes (including
car) and available ticket types in each of the market segments. Inner, middle and outer areas of
Sydney are sampled in roughly equal proportions, as is each mode.
A face to face home interview was undertaken with start points generated by randomly choosing
postcodes within each Statistical Local Area in Sydney. Within each postcode, a random street was
chosen to be cluster sampled. The sampling unit is the mode to ensure there are enough sampled
individuals currently choosing each of the alternative modes. This is corrected in estimation to
reproduce the base market shares at the ticket type level. In addition, all observations are weighted to
the distribution of personal income for commuter demand as revealed in the 1991 Sydney Travel
Survey.  Although the survey included ferry and jet cat options, we have excluded them from the
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current analysis, since many cities have only trains and buses available as public transport
competing with the automobile. Taxis were excluded from the commuter sample ..
4.2 Developing the Stated Choice Experiment
One of the challenges associated with using a stated choice approach is the need to present
individuals with an experiment which offers realistic scenarios to all respondents. Given that people
use different modes and travel over greatly varying distances, it is necessary to develop a range of
showcards with different modal combinations and different travel distances. Answers in the
questionnaire tell the interviewer which showcards are appropriate for which respondents.
The showcards developed for this study cover every combination of main mode (car, train, bus) and
have levels for short trips (less than 15 minutes), medium trips (15-30 minutes) and long trips (over
30 minutes). These times refer to the length of time spent in the main mode only, not the access,
egress or waiting times. To keep the experiment and sample size to a manageable size, the public
transport ticket categories were collapsed down to those most frequently used. Table 3 shows the
distribution of ticket sales in 1991.
Table 3 Profile of Public Transport Commuters by Ticket Type
Ticket Type Frequency Relative Frequency (%)
Metroten — blue 12,137 4.2
Metroten — green 2,801 1.0
Metroten — orange 226 0.1
Metroten — red 17,426 6.0
Other 4,287 1.5
Quarterly — not travel pass 4,444 1.5
Return ticket 31,832 11.0
Single ticket 41,989 14.4
TravelPass — blue 10,282 3.5
TravelPass — brown 679 0.2
TravelPass — green 6,958 2.4
TravelPass — orange 683 0.2
TravelPass — pink 2,920 1.0
TravelPass — purple 482 0.2
TravelPass — red 20,159 6.9
TravelPass — two zone 595 0.2
TravelPass — yellow 555 0.2
Weekly — not travel pass 119,632 41.2
Yearly — not travel pass 12,416 4.3
Total 290,503 100.0
Source: 1991 Sydney Travel Survey. Data are based on home to work and work to home
trips for an average weekday and include Sydney Region residents only.
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Using the distribution in Table 3, an experimental design was developed based on 1 car, 4 train
tickets (single, off-peak, weekly and travel pass), and 4 bus tickets (single, travel ten, combined bus-
ferry travel pass, and combined bus-ferry-train travel pass) — a total of 9 alternatives that are
hypothetically possible for any respondent. The full range of fares in the choice experiment are
summarised in Table 4.
Establishing a Fare Elasticity Regime
David A. Hensher
16
Table 4. The Stated Choice Experiment Fare Categories and Levels
Train: Single (Off Peak
Return)
Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $0.80 ($0.90) $1.60 ($1.80) $2.40 ($2.60)
Medium $1.30 ($1.40) $2.60 ($2.80) $3.90 ($4.20)
Long $1.80 ($2.00) $3.60 ($4.00) $5.40 ($6.00)
Train: Weekly Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $6.80 $11.50 $18.30
Medium $9.70 $19.40 $29.00
Long $13.20 $26.00 $40.00
Train: TravelPass Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $10.00 $20.00 $30.00
Medium $14.00 $28.00 $42.00
Long $20.00 $39.00 $59.00
Bus: Single Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $0.60 $1.20 $1.80
Medium $1.30 $2.50 $3.80
Long $2.00 $3.90 $5.90
Bus: TravelTen Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $4.00 $8.00 $12.00
Medium $8.00 $16.00 $24.00
Long $16.00 $32.00 $48.00
Bus:TravelPass
(Bus/Ferry)
Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $8.60 $17.10 $26.00
Medium $11.70 $23.00 $35.00
Long $17.20 $34.00 $52.00
Bus: TravelPass
(Bus/Ferry/Train)
Low Fare Current Fare High Fare
Short $10.00 $20.00 $30.00
Medium $14.00 $28.00 $42.00
Long $19.50 $39.00 $59.00
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Response Rates
The effective response rate was 37%, which is about average for surveys of equivalent length
(Richardson et al 1995). While the full sample collected was 649 cases, not all cases had sufficient
data to be suitable for modelling. The sample is a fairly broad representation of the Sydney
population, though males and the elderly are slightly under-represented (see Hensher and Raimond
1995 for further details).
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5.2 Empirical Models
The final models jointly estimated with 7 SP alternatives and 7 RP alternatives are presented in
Tables 6 and 7. Summary statistics describing the attributes of each indirect utility expression are
given in Table 5, together with sample size. The mean of  cost for multi-trip tickets is derived from
the ticket price divided by the number of one-way trips actually undertaken by each commuter,
allowing for the use of the ticket for non-commuting travel (a point often overlooked). The off-peak
train single option was deleted because so few commuters choose it; in addition we had to combine
the two bus travel passes (bus/ferry and bus/ferry/train) to secure enough commuters choosing one
of these ticket types. McFadden (1984, page 1442) has stated that
 “As a rule of thumb, sample sizes which yield less than thirty responses per alternative
produce estimators which cannot be analysed reliably by asymptotic methods”.
The distribution of SP costs encompass the RP cost levels although the composition of the sample in
terms of captivity to public transport given a ticket type differs quite markedly. This is expected
given that all SP fare options within  a mode were offered to each respondent whereas the RP data
define two alternatives - the chosen ticket (or mode) and one viable alternative. One most notable
difference is in  multi-use tickets (eg train weekly, travel pass and bus travel ten) where the higher
incidence of RP captivity to  public transport reflects reality much better than does the SP profile.
Including captivity and car availability in both the SP and RP choice sets however  is a valid
application of contextual impacts on choices. Ceteris paribus, one expects there to be greater
substitution between fare classes than between modes as a result of higher incidences of public
transport captivity. Importantly this effect can be observed and modelled when ticket types are
treated endogenously. Previous studies which evaluate modal choice in terms of an average fare or a
single fare type per commuter are unable to represent the amount of movement between ticket types
as a natural response to price changes. Such models ‘force’ switching between modes,
overestimating the impact of fares policies on modal choice, unless within-mode cross elasticities
approach zero.
Fare or cost was included initially as a nonlinear effect truncated at the second-order level (equation
5). The quadratic of cost was found to be positive but not statistically significant (Table 6) under the
non-constant variance assumption. Interestingly the quadratic of cost was highly significant (t-value
of  9.06) in a constant variance multinomial logit model, suggesting the presence of confoundment of
scale and taste weight, which is separately identified under the HEV specification. Previous studies
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that have investigated the presence of an income effect ( eg Jara-Diaz and Ortuzar 1988, Jara-Diaz
and Videla 1989) may have indeed made an incorrect interpretation of the presence or absence of an
income effect because of the reliance on a simple multinomial logit model which surpresses the
unobserved variance to be equal across the alternatives.  Consequently we conclude the absence of
an income effect in the present study; which may be intuitively sensible given the small amount of an
individual’s budget in Sydney devoted to commuting use-related marginal costs.
The level of service attributes represented by mode-specific door-to-door travel time are statistically
significant, producing behavioural values of travel time savings at the sample mean of fare or cost
ranging from  $3.36 per person hour  for train and $4.60 per person hour for car and  $4.75 per
person hour for bus. The public transport values are lower than those derived from the multinomial
logit model ($3.60 for train and $5.40 for bus), however the car value is higher (MNL value of
$4.40). The MNL car value is comparable to that found in another study by Hensher for Sydney in
the context of route choice, of $4.35 per person hour (Hensher 1997). These directional results are
identical to what we have found in Hensher (1966) in  a commuter mode choice study for 6 capital
cities. Although it is early evidence, one might be tempted to suggest that relaxing the constant
variance assumption redistributes the potential time benefits of modes in favour of the automobile,
away from the relatively inflated values of travel time savings for public transport:
 “....in the basic logit model ...[as]... the result of failure to account for some unobserved
influences on relative utility which are suppressed through the constant variance
assumption and consequently ‘distributed’ to the observed effects’ (Hensher 1996, 11).
If one identified an income effect, then personal income should be introduced into the utility
expression for every alternative, in line with the theoretical requirement. We have estimated a model
with explicit treatment of the income effect, by dividing cost by the expenditure rate, reported in
Table 7 for completeness. A comparison of the models in Tables 6 and 7 on a likelihood ratio test
yields a ratio of - 52.06 which with one degree of freedom difference leads us to  conclude that the
two models are significantly different in goodness of fit with the zero income effect model has greater
explanatory power over the income effect model.
To our knowledge this is the first study to combine the behavioural realism of free variance in the
unobserved effects together with a theoretically defensible functional specification for the attributes
in the indirect utility expressions and the richness of data fusion through mixing SP and RP choice
sets. This mixture adds diversity and robustness to the process for deriving the matrix of direct and
cross elasticities.
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When the scale differences across all alternatives in both the SP and RP data are taken into account,
the parameter estimates for each attribute common to an alternative appearing in both the SP and RP
data sets should be generic. There is no microeconomic theoretical reason for treating them as data
set specific which has traditionally been the assumption in both sequential and joint estimation of
SP-RP models resulting in a single scale parameter attributed to all alternatives in a specific data set
(e.g. Morikawa 1989, Hensher and Bradley 1993, Swait et al 1994).
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Table 5 Summary Statistics of Estimation Sample (standard deviations in parenthesis)
Stated Preference Sub Sample
Alternative
Out of pocket
 cost ($)
Door to Door
 time (mins)
Captive to PT
(proportion)
Car available
(proportion)
Sample
size
Total Sample:
Train single 2.89 (1.50) 69.4 (29.6) 0.081 - 540
Train  weekly 2.11 (1.90) 69.4 (29.6) 0.081 - 540
Train travel pass 3.18 (1.61) 69.4 (29.6) 0.081 - 540
Bus single 2.34 (1.49) 53.6 (26.5) 0.119 - 472
Bus travel ten 1.67 (1.23) 53.6 (26.5) 0.119 - 472
Bus  travel pass 1.54 (0.83) 53.6 (26.4) 0.119 - 472
Car 2.88 (2.63) 44.9 (33.3) - 0.80 812
Sample who Chose that Alternative
Train single 2.09 (1.18) 57.18 (31.3) 0.112 - 98
Train  weekly 1.90 (0.92) 74.09 (28.3) 0.127 - 150
Train travel pass 2.31 (1.28) 71.58 (31.3) 0.083 - 60
Bus single 1.36 (0.63) 37.55 (21.4) 0.182 - 55
Bus travel ten 1.15 (0.74) 42.21 (21.3) 0.208 - 77
Bus  travel pass 1.55 (1.16) 48.56 (21.2) 0.365 - 52
Car 2.14 (2.07) 34.17 (23.8) - 1.0 420
Revealed Preference Sub Sample
Alternative
Out of pocket
 cost ($)
Door to Door
 time (mins)
Captive to PT
(proportion)
Car available
(proportion)
Sample
size
Total Sample:
Train single 1.64 (1.19) 64.29 (31.1) 0.044 - 272
Train  weekly 2.46 (0.85) 72.58 (28.6) 0.317 - 248
Train travel pass 1.28 (1.32) 79.60 (27.8) 0.200 - 45
Bus single 2.37 (1.29) 51.26 (24.5) 0.074 - 324
Bus travel ten 1.17 (0.67) 60.60 (32.8) 0.160 - 100
Bus  travel pass 1.94 (0.31) 46.25 (20.7) 0.333 - 48
Car 2.12 (2.04) 44.88 (33.3) - 0.80 812
Sample who Chose that Alternative
Train single 2.15 (1.21) 59.91 (30.7) 0.088 136
Train  weekly 2.59 (0.79) 74.82 (27.8) 0.130 216
Train travel pass 2.40 (1.50) 82.50 (40.1) 0.500 32
Bus single 2.05 (1.19) 38.33 (19.0) 0.250 96
Bus travel ten 1.08 (0.54) 37.08 (21.7) 0.333 48
Bus  travel pass 1.99 (0.30) 47.78 (20.9) 0.444 36
Car 1.39 (1.03) 33.23 (23.3) - 1.00 372
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Table 6. HEV model: Joint Estimation of SP and RP Choices to evaluate the presence of 
an income effect
Attribute Units Alternative SP Parameter
Estimates
t-value RP Parameter
Estimates
t-value
One-way trip cost (or fare) Dollars All -.34966 -4.15 -.34966 -4.15
Trip cost squared Dollars All 0.00365 0.79 0.00365 0.79
Door-to-door time Minutes Train -.01862 -4.44 -.01862 -4.44
Door-to-door time Minutes Bus -.02659 -4.95 -.02659 -4.95
Door-to-door time Minutes Car -.02517 -5.86 -.02517 -5.86
Train single constant Train 7.8198 3.84 8.7959 3.98
Train  weekly constant Train 8.2091 3.93 10.319 4.17
Train travel pass constant Train 8.0665 3.90 9.2150 3.31
Bus single constant Bus 8.3482 4.00 9.4006 4.13
Bus travel ten constant Bus 8.2200 3.95 9.6701 4.08
Bus  travel pass constant Bus 8.1234 3.94 9.7870 3.34
Car constant Car - - - -
Captive to train dummy Train 1.0657 2.42 1.0657 2.42
Captive to bus dummy Bus 1.4792 3.44 1.4792 3.44
Car availability dummy 1,0 Car 9.2935 4.09 9.2935 4.09
Scale Parameters
 (StdDev in (  ))
Train single Train 0.962 (1.3336) 3.58 1.515 (0.8467) 3.73
Train  weekly Train 0.527 (2.4358) 2.46 0.340 (3.7723) 1.33
Train travel pass Train 0.559 (2.2941) 3.57 0.557 (2.3045) 1.11
Bus single Bus 0.510 (2.5139) 3.14 0.307 (4.1828) 1.16
Bus travel ten Bus 0.780 (1.6448) 3.51 0.353 (3.6309) 1.18
Bus travel pass Bus 0.515 (2.4926) 3.01 0.615 (2.0844) 1.82
Car Car 3.338 (0.3842) 4.25 1.283 (1.0000) Fixed
Value of travel time savings *)
Train $/hour 3.36
Bus $/hour 4.75
Car $/hour 4.60
Sample size 1824
Log-likelihood at convergence -1547.64
Pseudo r-squared .730
note: Value of travel time savings is calculated per one-way trip based on average number of one-way trips
per ticket.
5.3 Fare Type and Car Cost Direct and Cross Share Elasticities
A heteroskedastic extreme value logit model relaxes the constant variance assumption of the
standard multinomial logit model allowing the cross- elasticities to be alternative specific. The final
set of direct and cross-elasticities are reported in Table 8. The reported results are probability
weighted average estimates, derived from estimates for each individual in the sample. Each column
provides one direct share elasticity and 6 cross share elasticities. A direct or cross elasticity
represents the relationship between a percentage change in fare level and a percentage change in the
proportion of daily one-way trips by the particular mode and ticket type.
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For example, the column headed TS tells us that a 1% increase in the train single fare leads to a
0.218% reduction in the proportion of daily one-way trips by train on a single fare. In addition, this
1% single fare increase leads to a 0.001% higher proportion of one-way trips on a train travel pass
and .001% increase in one-way trips on a train weekly ticket.
The set of fare elasticities are based on the use of the SP parameter estimates for fare and cost,
rescaled into the RP model which provides the choice probabilities and fare (or car cost) attribute
levels. Since the HEV model does not have a closed form solution, the elasticity formula is complex
requiring the derivation of integrals by quadrature for equation 10.  For completeness and
comparison we have reported the direct and cross elasticities from the SP model and the MNL direct
elasticities (noting that the cross elasticities for an MNL model are uninformative).
The results offer many implications. The differences in direct elasticities  between the SP and RP
choice sets reflects the different probabilities of choice. As is well known, although often ignored,
studies which derive elasticities from stand-alone SP models produce different switching propensities
to the RP estimates because the SP experiment is often searching in a more expansive utility space of
choice opportunities, producing a different probability profile than an RP model. It is necssary to
‘return’ the paramter power of an SP model back to the RP space regardless of whether new
alternatives are introduced to the market or existing alternatives removed. Since an elasticity
calculation uses three inputs - a predicted choice probability, a taste weight (and a scale parameter in
an HEV model) and an attribute level, the appropriate probabilities for predicting switching
behaviour in the current market must come from a base or enhanced RP model.  The RP direct
elasticities for public transport are lower than the SP equivalences; however since the results are
driven primarily by probability differences, some elasticities must be higher for the SP model. This is
the case for the car mode; explained by the fact that the SP percentage choosing the car is less than
the actual market share.
For direct elasticities, sensitivity within the commuter rail and bus markets decreases as we move
from a single ticket through to multiple-trip tickets. This has interesting implications for a fares
policy - increasing the price of a multi-use ticket offers higher revenue growth prospects for small
losses of patronage than is the case for single tickets. The cross elasticities suggest that there is more
movement between modes for a given fare class than between fare classes within modes. The
strongest  cross-mode substitution occurs between train and bus single tickets, although it is not
symmetrical, with cross elasticities of 0.067 and 0.057 for train to bus and bus to train respectively.
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The largest cross elasticity is 0.335 for the switch from car to train travel pass in the event of a price
increase in car use. The extant empirical evidence suggests that trains have more success in
attracting commuters out of cars than do buses. A travel pass per trip is the best value for money
train fare (see Table 5) where the price per one-way trip is $1.28 compared to $1.64 for a train
single and $2.46 for a travel ten ticket. All  the cross elasticities associated with car operating costs
are sizeable compared to the other modal switching contexts. Interestingly, changes in public
transport fares across all ticket categories have less of an impact on car use than does a change in
car costs have on public transport use.
Table 7. HEV model: Joint Estimation of SP and RP Choices with an expenditure base for 
cost
Attribute Units Alternative SP Parameter
Estimates
t-value RP Parameter
Estimates
t-value
One-way trip cost/purchasing
power
ratio of
costs
All -.05107 -3.42 -.05107 -3.42
Door-to-door time Minutes Train -.018557 -3.05 -.018557 -3.05
Door-to-door time Minutes Bus -.028563 -3.09 -.028563 -3.09
Door-to-door time Minutes Car -.026994 -3.35 -.026994 -3.35
Train single constant Train 7.6407 3.15 8.4911 3.30
Train  weekly constant Train 8.0047 3.19 10.065 3.80
Train travel pass constant Train 7.8369 3.16 8.9253 2.91
Bus single constant Bus 8.0952 3.17 8.4977 3.45
Bus travel ten constant Bus 7.9374 3.16 9.4151 3.34
Bus  travel pass constant Bus 7.9451 3.18 9.6278 3.00
Car constant Car - - - -
Captive to train dummy Train 1.0190 1.96 1.0190 1.96
Captive to bus dummy Bus 1.4144 2.78 1.4144 2.78
Car availability dummy 1,0 Car 9.0545 3.25 9.0545 3.25
Scale Parameters
 (StdDev in (  ))
Train single Train 0.908 (1.4125) 2.97 1.414 (0.9071) 2.23
Train  weekly Train 0.498 (2.5745) 2.44 0.804 (1.5946) 1.25
Train travel pass Train 0.522 (2.4563) 2.87 0.678 (1.8910) 1.17
Bus single Bus 0.567 (2.2618) 2.68 1.150 (1.1149) 1.72
Bus travel ten Bus 0.936 (1.3704) 2.72 0.525 (2.4409) 1.33
Bus travel pass Bus 0.529 (2.4229) 2.48 0.932 (1.3766) 1.27
Car Car 3.264 (0.3929) 3.31 1.283 (1.0000) -
Sample size 1824
Log-likelihood at convergence -1573.67
Pseudo r-squared .725
Table 8. Direct and Cross Share Elasticities
Note: Elasticities relate to the price per one-way trip. SP direct and cross elasticities from the HEV model
are in parenthesis. The MNL direct elasticities are in square brackets from the RP and SP choice sets
respectively. The interpretation for a specific fare class is obtained under each column heading.
TS TW TP BS BT BP Car
Train single
(TS)
-.218 (-.702)
[-.161 -.517]
.001 (.289) .001 (.149) .057 (.012) .005 (.015) .005 (.009) .196 (.194)
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Train  weekly
 (TW)
.001 (.213) -.093 (-.635)
[-.057,-.313]
.001 (.358) .001 (.025) .001 (.024) .006 (.019) .092 (.229)
Train travel
pass (TP)
.001 (.210) .001 (.653) -.196 (-1.23)
[-.111,-.597]
.001 (.023) .012 (.022) .001 (.017) .335 (.218)
Bus single
  (BS)
.067 (.023) .001 (.053) .001 (.031) -.357 (-.914)
[-.217,-.418]
.001 (.248) .001 (.286) .116 (.096)
Bus travel
ten (BT)
.020 (.020) .004 (.037) .002 (.023) .001 (.206) -.160 (-.462)
[-.083,-.268]
.001 (.163) .121 (.090)
Bus travel
pass  (BP)
.007 (.025) .036 (.063) .001 (.034) .001 (.395) .001 (.290) -.098 (-.700)
[-.072,-.293]
.020 (.103)
Car  (C1) .053 (.014) .042 (.023) .003 (.013) .066 (.009) .016 (.011) .003 (.006) -.197 (-.138)
[-.130,-.200]
A comparison of the HEV and MNL revealed preference elasticities  shows a systematically lower set
of direct elasticity estimates for all alternatives in the MNL model; thus we might conclude that an
SP model tends to produce lower elasticities  than its RP counterpart where the SP choice
probabilities are higher than the RP probabilities; and MNL direct elasticity estimates tend to be
lower than their HEV counterparts in both RP and SP models. The implication, if generalisable, is
that all previous studies which have used an MNL framework and/or a stand-alone SP model
specification have made sizeable errors in their estimation of direct share elasticities. Since the
majority of travel choice studies have adopted this MNL framework, the findings are quite
troublesome for the extant literature.
Finally, if we take the empirical evidence in Table 1 on cross elasticities and compare it with Table
8, we have a number of estimates for Sydney which can be directly compared. The estimate for
Sydney of 0.09 for car with respect to train fares is higher than the three estimates in Table 8 of
0.053, 0.042 and 0.003; likewise the combined bus and train estimate of .06 in Table 1 is only
exceeded by 0.066 for the bus single ticket, but a weighed average is significantly lower than .06.
The evidence in Table 1 suggests that studies in the past based on methods possibly less rigorous
than those applied herein have tended to overestimate cross elasticities; however the great variation
in estimates promotes caution in generalising too much. It does appear however that the previous
estimates for Sydney commuters provided by Hensher and Bullock (1979) and Madan and
Groenhout (1987) are overestimates.
6. Conclusions
The results reported here are based on estimation of stated and revealed choice data where the
variances of the unobserved components of the indirect utility expressions associated with each of
the 7 ticket/mode alternatives are different. The taste weights attached to fares in the stated choice
model have been rescaled by the ratio of the variances associated with fare for a particular
alternative across the two model systems so that the richness of the fare data in the stated choice
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experiment enriches the market model. The resulting matrix of direct and cross elasticities  reflects
the market environment in which commuters make choices while benefiting by an enhanced
understanding of how travellers respond to fare profiles not always observed in real markets, but
including fare profiles which are of interest as potential alternatives to the current market offerings.
A better understanding of market sensitivity to classes of tickets is promoted as part of the
improvement in management practices designed to improve fare yields. In this paper we have
examined a number of approaches to estimating a matrix of direct and cross price share elasticities,
and provide for the first time a complete asymmetric matrix. The Institute of Transport Studies has
developed a decision support system (titled ‘Fares Fair’) in which the matrix of elasticities are the
behavioural base. Public transport operators in NSW are using the DSS to evaluate the implications
on revenue and patronage of alternative fare scenarios in respect of mixture of ticket types and levels
of fares. Extensions of the current paper are in progress which accommodate new ticket types and
extend the empirical results to non-commuter markets.
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